



European views on the UK’s renegotiation: Czech Republic,
Hungary, Sweden, and Lithuania
The success or failure of David Cameron’s planned renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership will depend to a large
extent on how the other 27 EU member states respond to his proposals. But how do countries across the EU view the
UK’s renegotiation? Building on a report published in 2014 by the German Council on Foreign Relations, EUROPP is
running a series of overviews of the renegotiation from each of the EU’s member states. Compiled by the LSE’s Tim
Oliver and written by authors based at universities and research institutions, the overviews will set out what discussion
– if any – there has been about the renegotiation and the wider views within each country on the renegotiation and a
potential Brexit. This post is the sixth in the series and gives views from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, and
Lithuania.
Czech Republic: A desire to accommodate British demands, but without treaty changes
Hungary: A natural supporter for Cameron, but with caveats
Sweden: Both risks and opportunities in EU renegotiation
Lithuania: Britain is threatening the EU’s fundamental principles
Czech Republic: A desire to accommodate British demands, but without treaty changes
Britain’s attempt to renegotiate its EU membership has received little political and public attention in
the Czech Republic. As in other Central European states, debate has been dominated by the ongoing
migration crisis and the fight against the EU’s resettlement quotas. So far no Czech political leader
has commented on the British demands and the Czech government has not adopted any position for
the negotiations.
It is, however, clear that the Czech Republic strongly supports keeping the UK inside the EU. Britain
has long been considered a natural ally in several policy areas. It strongly supports the single market,
liberalisation of trade, a strong transatlantic partnership and the positions of both countries on other foreign policy
issues are traditionally very similar. It is a shared opinion amongst Czech political leaders that a Brexit would harm
the EU as well as Czech interests.
Hence we can expect that the Czech Republic will pursue solutions that will accommodate British demands. However,
this will need to be achieved without comprising the basic foundations of the European integration project. Czechs will
definitely support British demands for enhancing the single market, especially in the area of services, the digital
market, and energy, as these are also priorities for the Czech government. The Czech Republic has always promoted
elimination of trade barriers, thus the government will support British any demands for a quick completion of trade
deals with the US and other big economies.
The Czech government is hesitant to support British demands that would require change of the EU’s treaty. The
Czech government’s recently adopted EU strategy took a negative view towards treaty changes. In line with this
position, the country is unlikely to support a British opt–out from “ever closer union” if this is pursued as a treaty
change. Support for such a British opt–out would undermine long-term Czech efforts to preserve and foster the EU’s
unity.
Similarly, like most of the other EU countries, and especially those who joined the EU in the last decade, the country
will be strongly against any measures that would discriminate against citizens of other EU member states. The EU’s
four freedoms, and especially the freedom of movement of people, are considered untouchable. This of course
doesn’t mean that the Czech Government is opposed to debate on how to tackle abuses of this freedom. Taking into
consideration the relatively small number of Czechs living and working in the UK (around 40,000), the government will
probably leave the fight for freedom of movement of people to member states such as Poland who have more of an
interest in this area.
On the other hand, we can expect the Czech Republic to support a greater say for national parliaments in EU
decision-making, including the introduction of the so-called green card system. Again, however, this would ideally
happen without treaty changes. The Czech government also shares British concerns that the Economic and Monetary
Union policies that effect all the EU Member States should be debated in the EU-28 format.
Vladimír Bartovic – EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
Vladimír Bartovic is director of EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Prague.
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Hungary: A natural supporter for Cameron, but with caveats
Hungary is a medium sized member state in the EU, with a geographical position, allies, partners,
and priorities in the European agenda that are often fundamentally different from those of the UK.
Despite these differences, over the past four years Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been seen as
David Cameron’s natural partner and supporter on some major EU Council decisions.
The two leaders were often mentioned together after the negotiations of the European Fiscal
Compact in 2012, and there was some confusion on the night when the pact was announced with
some reports indicating that Hungary was to side with the UK and remain outside of the agreement.
Orbán and Cameron also shared a common position during the election process of the new President of the
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. Both prime ministers were against Junker’s nomination and against the
strengthening of the role of the European Parliament at the expense of the European Council.
Viktor Orbán was elected Hungary’s prime minister with a two-third majority in 2010 and his party FIDESZ managed
to repeat its victory for a second term with another two-third majority in 2014. This previously unprecedented
parliamentary position was used to centralise the party’s power, change the country’s constitution, and fundamentally
transform the economy.
After a strong and generally well-received European Council presidency in 2011, a series of constitutional, political
and economic decisions (for example, changes to the banking tax and the energy market) led to tensions between the
EU and Hungary, with several spectacular clashes in the European Parliament. Many even describe the government
of Hungary as one of the most Eurosceptic governments currently in the EU.
Although political and economic relations with Britain are in good shape, Germany and Austria are Hungary’s most
important foreign trade partners and political allies in the EU, so any decision over the UK’s renegotiation will take into
careful account the position of these Member States. On a whole, though, Hungary strongly supports British
membership in the EU. A Brexit would fundamentally change the geometry of EU voting, which would eventually
cause mid-sized countries to lose some influence.
Cameron’s hard opposition to ‘even closer union’ sits well with the anti-federal rhetoric of the Hungarian government.
The summary of the 2011 EU presidency priorities of Hungary claimed that Hungary was committed to the community
method, which should take precedence over intergovernmental decision-making. It stated that, ‘Crisis situations could
lead to the temporary strengthening of intergovernmentalism which can only be accepted if a return to decision-
making within the framework of the Treaty is possible in the short run.’
Despite this, by 2013, Mr Orbán’s rhetoric had shifted strongly towards intergovernmentalism. He made clear that
“Hungary pursues a policy of balance and does not approve of national competences being converted ‘on the sly’ into
community-level competences in the EU”. He went on to argue that “there are more and more new proposals to
disturb the balance between national and community competences and this is unacceptable”. Therefore, Hungary
would welcome reform proposals that would shift the institutional balance within the EU, for example by moving the
Commission away from the Parliament and towards the Council of Ministers.
No one can expect any major treaty changes in this field since this faces strong opposition from France and Germany.
But as the Hungarian government emphasised recently, Hungary would not currently support any major shift towards
an even closer economic union. For example, Hungary would resist further tax harmonisation, as it is an advocate of
competition between tax regimes.
Giving more power to national parliaments would secure the symbolic support of Hungary, although it would
undermine the current system by which national governments represent the national interests in the supranational
institutions. This trade-off would eventually result in a softer position on this reform proposal, although some elements
would still be supported, for example better scrutinising of matters connected to subsidiarity and proportionality.
As the target date for Hungary adopting the Euro slips further, the unification of the Eurozone’s economic governance
becomes more problematic for outsiders such as Hungary because it is evident that the future integration of the EU
will mainly occur within the Eurozone. Because of this, Hungary, like other outsiders, worries that their national
interests will not be equally represented within the EU. Hungary will therefore support Cameron’s aim to introduce
more safeguards in this area.
Many think that reform proposals regarding competitiveness and financial regulations in the EU will be agreed
relatively easily, including the UK’s aim to extend the single market in services. However, these proposals could cause
controversies in Hungary. The country’s banking tax is the highest in Europe, and the government has shown
nationalisation tendencies in different sectors of the economy, with heavy windfall taxes on some businesses meaning
they are in a weakened position to compete in the single market.
Cameron’s proposals for a major curb on immigration and free movement of labour in the EU, such as through limiting
in-work and out-of-work benefits available to migrants from EU Member States, has received a cold reception in the
Central and Eastern European Member States. In recent years, London has become the fifth biggest Hungarian city
and the number of Hungarians emigrating to Britain remains high. That said, some concessions could be made,
especially in the field of out-of-work benefits, if the changes related only to Britain.
Finally, questions remain as to how Cameron can achieve reforms within the EU. Opening up the treaties would cause
problems for Hungary, since, to pick one example, the incorporation of further liberalisation of the services market
would clash with the centralisation tendencies of the government’s economic policy. If treaties are opened to a deal
over institutional changes surrounding the Eurozone’s economic governance, then this could lead to a situation where
Hungary cannot block a “package decision”.
Summing up, proposing changes – both those UK-specific in character and those aimed at the wider EU – that avoid
treaty modifications would make it easier to secure the support of Hungary’s government and parliament.
Zoltán Gálik – Corvinus University of Budapest
Zoltán Gálik is an Associate Professor at Corvinus University of Budapest, International Studies Department 
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Sweden: Both risks and opportunities in EU renegotiation
Sweden has a strong political and economic interest in ensuring that the UK remains firmly in the EU.
Both countries are close partners in Europe, sharing common positions on various issues (such as
free trade, competitiveness and fiscal discipline) as well as similar political outlooks. Sweden is
therefore broadly sympathetic to London’s attempts to reform the EU, although with some notable
caveats. Moreover, it’s clearly in Sweden’s interest to encourage the UK to negotiate constructively
and to help Cameron obtain what he needs in order to keep the UK in the EU.
Under the former Swedish center-right government, David Cameron enjoyed a close personal
relationship to his Swedish counterpart, Fredrik Reinfelt, an ideological soul mate of sorts. Sweden’s Social
Democratic Party, elected to government in 2014, has continued to pursue a close relationship with London.
Illustrating the closeness between Sweden and the UK, Stockholm recently hosted George Osborne to discuss
common perspectives on EU reform. So far, the new Swedish government has opted for a fairly low profile on this and
other European issues—unlike its predecessor, which sought to play a key role in Brussels, spearheaded by its then-
foreign minister Carl Bildt.
From a Swedish perspective, the UK’s reform efforts in the EU are at once an opportunity and a risk.  On the one
hand, Sweden shares Cameron’s desire for a more lean, effective and less bureaucratic EU where non-Eurozone
states are not overrun. For example, Sweden would be in favor of less centralization of power in Brussels, better
coexistence between the Single Market and an integrated Eurozone, and of giving national parliaments a bigger say
over EU affairs. At the same time, Sweden sees some risks in the British renegotiation efforts. For example, any
attempt to restrict freedom of movement or access to social benefits within the EU would be met by strong opposition
from Stockholm.
It is worth noting that if Cameron succeeds in keeping the UK in the EU on terms that do not compromise the core
principles of the EU, then Sweden would also likely want to make sure that it too could tap into any such deal. It is
therefore in Sweden’s and other smaller EU states’ interest that the UK’s negotiations with the EU do not take place
exclusively behind closed doors but in an open and transparent way.
While the idea of a Brexit has received some attention in Sweden’s domestic debate, local media has less extensively
covered Cameron’s renegotiation efforts. A possible explanation for this is Sweden’s own current struggle with the
refugee crisis—an issue that dominates the domestic debate and which is causing political uncertainty.
Like the rest of the EU, the Swedish government will make clear its specific positions on the UK’s renegotiation terms
when the UK itself makes clear its demands. While generally sympathetic to London’s efforts to reform the EU,
Stockholm is cautious against compromising on some of the Union’s core principles. That said, Sweden does not want
to see the UK leave the Union. It would lose an important and like-minded ally. But how far Stockholm is willing to go
to prevent such a scenario remains to be seen.
Erik Brattberg – McCain Institute, Washington D.C. 
Erik Brattberg is a senior fellow at the McCain Institute and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic
relations at Johns Hopkins University SAIS in Washington, DC.
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Lithuania: Britain is threatening the EU’s fundamental principles
Britain’s attempt to renegotiate its relationship with the EU by dropping the commitment to an “ever
closer union” and asking for opt-outs in specific areas of EU policies related to migration policy,
welfare and competitiveness have raised serious concerns in Lithuania about the future integration of
the EU. Some of the changes that David Cameron is seeking may significantly affect the functioning
of the single market and the upholding of its core principles.
Britain’s attempt to renegotiate its EU membership has not gone unnoticed in Lithuania, which like
other EU member countries has expressed criticism of Britain’s demands to opt out of some EU
employment legislation. Commenting on Britain’s demands, the president of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė has
repeatedly underlined that no decisions can be made that undermine the fundamental values of the EU. For
Grybauskaitė and the Lithuanian Government, the EU should adapt to a changing socioeconomic environment, but
the Union’s core principles and values should be maintained. All of Britain’s attempts to renegotiate its membership in
the EU should therefore be discussed with this in mind.
One of the renegotiation points raised by David Cameron has been a proposal to tighten migration policy to the UK by
restricting access for EU nationals to in-work benefits and setting a four year residency test. The proposed
amendments would create additional obstacles to the free movement of workers, meaning new migrants would have
to wait for four years in order to access certain benefits such as tax credits or child benefit. Such a decision would
significantly affect the citizens of EU Member States in Eastern Europe, including Lithuania and other Baltic states.
The UK, together with Germany and the Nordic countries, is among the top destinations for emigrating Lithuanians.
According to the 2011 census for England and Wales, around 100,000 Lithuanians reside in England and more arrive
each year. The Lithuanian president underlined that all EU citizens should be given the right to work and move freely
around the EU, which is one of the fundamental principles of the EU’s single market. Freedom of movement for
workers, goods, services and capital are key to a fully functioning single market.
Grybauskaitė has also stressed many times that a fully integrated EU is more useful for Lithuania than a fragmented
one. As one of the largest EU members, Britain plays a crucial role in preserving the Union’s unity and
competitiveness. Therefore, from a Lithuanian perspective, reducing further the number of areas in which Britain is a
fully engaged EU member could pose a threat to the fundamental principles of the Union.
Živilė Vaicekauskaite – Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University
Živilė Vaicekauskaite is based at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science in Vilnius University.
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